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Not very long ago hybrid exchange rate regimes -- including crawling pegs, 
crawling bands, and pegged-but-adjustable systems -- were very popular among policy 
makers and economists in the emerging countries. All of this changed in the late-1990s 
when as a result of successive currency crises a number of authors began to argue that in 
a world of high capital mobility, middle-of-the-road exchange rate regimes were highly 
unstable.  As a result of this, during the last few years the so-called “two corners” 
solution on exchange rate regimes has become increasingly dominant.  According to this 
view countries should either have a floating exchange rate, or they should opt for a super-
fixed exchange rate regime – that is, a currency board or full official dollarization 
(Fischer 2001).  
During most of the 1990s Argentina, with its currency board, was the poster child 
of super-fixed regimes. Not only had Argentina done quite well during 1991-97, but more 
importantly, it was the only large country with a functioning super-fixed exchange rate 
system.  Mussa (2002) explains how, and in spite of initial IMF skepticism, the Argentine 
experience became increasingly popular in Washington policy circles.  The official sector 
support for the experience is perhaps best captured by the views of Ricardo Hausmann, 
the influential former Chief Economist of the Interamerican Development Bank, who in 
April 2001 went as far as arguing that other Latin American countries – including Brazil 
and Mexico – would soon follow Argentina and adopt a currency board.
1  Nothing of that 
sort happened, and in early 2002 Argentina’s adventure with a currency board came to an 
end, when deposits were frozen, the peso was devalued, and the government defaulted on 
its debt.   
The purpose of this paper is to discuss in what way, if any, the collapse of 
Argentina’s experience with a currency board has affected the policy debate on the 
appropriate exchange rate regime in emerging and transition countries. The rest of the 
paper is organized in four parts: In Section II I discuss some important aspects of the 
Argentine experience.  In particular, I deal with the run on deposits, and some of the 
consequences of abandoning convertibility in early 2002.  In Section III I discuss how the 
collapse of Argentina’s currency board has affected the arguments in favor of hard pegs.  
                                                           
1   See La Nación, April 6, 2001.   2
I point out that most supporters of super-fixed exchange rate regimes have not changed 
their minds, and continue to believe that hard pegs are an appropriate solution for many 
problems in the emerging countries.  In this section I also provide a summary of the 
existing evidence on performance under dollarization.  Section IV is devoted to 
discussing emerging countries’ experiences with flexible exchange rates, including the 
issue of “fear of floating.” I argue that incorporating exchange rate considerations into a 
Taylor rule does not constitute “fear of floating.”  Under most circumstances it is optimal 
floatation. I also point out that additional research is needed to understand whether 
“sterilized” intervention in foreign exchange markets is destabilizing.  Finally, Section VI 
I present some concluding thoughts, including some remarks on the practical relevance of 
the “two corners” approach to exchange rate policy. 
 
II.    Argentina’s Crisis, De-dollarization and Money Overhang 
Throughout its currency board experience, Argentina had a highly dollarized 
economy.  The public was repeatedly told that “a peso is a dollar, and a dollar is a 
peso,” and was encouraged to hold dollar-denominated deposits. A high percentage of 
banks’ portfolios were dollar-denominated, and by late 2001 more than 80 percent of the 
public debt was denominated in foreign currency.  Because of this high degree of 
dollarization, even authors that had questioned the wisdom of the hard peg and had 
argued that the peso was overvalued, were skeptical about the benefits of a devaluation of 
the peso.  In the presence of a high degree of balance sheet dollarization, they argued, a 
(real) devaluation would result in a large increase in debt burdens, and would unleash a 
string of bankruptcies.   
Towards mid 2001, and in the mist of a four-year recession, the Minister of the 
Economy Domingo Cavallo was desperately trying to deal with a perverse debt-
dynamics.  With the country risk premium exceeding 2,000 basis points, and with an 
increasingly contentious disagreement with the provinces regarding revenue transfers, 
Cavallo was rapidly running out of time.  As economic conditions deteriorated, a growing 
number of analysts began to debate publicly alternative ways out of the convertibility 
law.  On one camp were those that favored a partial default, while maintaining the basic 
features of convertibility and the currency board; on another camp were those that argued   3
that the only way out was to officially dollarized the economy, possibly at a rate higher 
that the prevailing one peso per dollar.  Another group called for a devaluation-cum-
pesification, followed by the adoption of a generalized indexation scheme.
2   
As it turned out, Minister Cavallo dismissed all of these schemes and insisted on 
his own program based on restructuring the public debt, providing an array of incentives 
to the industrial sector, and negotiating with the provinces.  In early December 2001, and 
as a way to quell a rapidly growing run on the banking system, the government 
implemented a deposit freeze and de facto exchange controls.  The public, which had 
repeatedly been assured that their savings were untouchable, was stunned.  It soon took to 
the streets and staged violent demonstrations that were severely repressed by police 
forces.  By December 19, and after more than twenty people were killed during violent 
protests, the government appeared to have lost control over events.  A day later President 
de la Rua resigned, bringing an era to an end.  In rapid succession Argentina went 
through three short-lived chief executives, until in mid-January 2002 Eduardo Duhalde – 
a Senator and former governor of the province of Buenos Aires – was appointed 
President by congress, with the mandate of finishing Mr. De la Rua’s period.
3 
The new authorities were quick to denounce the “old” economic policy – 
including the convertibility law -- as inefficient, recessionary and corrupt.  In designing a 
new policy, however, they did not follow any of the blueprints that had been thoroughly 
discussed in the preceding months.  Instead, they implemented a series of measures that 
included the worst elements of each of the existing proposals.  The peso was devalued, 
public debt – or most of it -- was defaulted, and dollar-denominated private debts were 
“pesified” at different and arbitrary rates.  Moreover, Cavallo’s deposit freeze was 
generalized and strengthened, and the public was forbidden to transfer deposits across 
banks.  The peso, which for more than a decade had stood at parity with the U.S. dollar, 
rapidly lost value, and in a few weeks the exchange rate surpassed the 3 pesos per dollar 
mark.  Politicians and many local analysts were astounded.  Not in their worst nightmares 
                                                           
2 Default, or partial default, was supported by a number of U.S. economists, including Charles Calomiris, 
Allan Meltzer, and Adam Lerrick.  This view was also supported by a number of Argentine politicians both 
from the opposition as well as from the main government party.  Dollarization was supported by a group of 
American academics, by the financial page of the Wall Street Journal, by former president Carlos Menem 
and by a group of Peronist economists.  Pesification followed by indexation and a floating exchange rate 
was supported by the editorial page of the Financial Times and by former IDB Chief Economist Hausmann.    4
did they expect the nominal devaluation to exceed 60 percent.
4  Growth forecasts for 
2002 indicate that GDP will contract between 15 and 20 percent; for 2003 most analysts 
expect and additional drop in GDP of the order of 5 percent. 
These tragic events showed that in a de-facto dollarized economy a devaluation 
can be very messy indeed.  Bank and corporate balance sheets were wrecked, and 
depositors clamored to get their money back.  Populist promises by the government did 
not help, and months after the currency was devalued the country was still paralyzed.  
Political instability grew by the day, as the population staged demonstrations against 
politicians, judges and bankers.  It became rapidly evident that reestablishing the 
payments system was a fundamental requirement for getting the economy moving again.  
This, however, required finding a solution for the deposit freeze problem; as long as 
deposits were frozen, there was little chance of getting banks functioning in a quasi-
normal way.  
The events of December 2001-January 2002 generated a colossal collapse in the 
demand for money in Argentina.  People that for over a decade had been told that a peso 
was as good as a dollar, suddenly realized that this was not the case.  Not only a peso was 
not a dollar, but also after the freeze a “peso” was not even a “peso.”  Simply put, people 
did not want to hold the Argentine currency.  Yet, because deposits were frozen, they 
were unable to dispose of unwanted pesos. By early 2002 Argentina faced a massive 
monetary overhang situation, similar to that prevailing in the Eastern European countries 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
5   
The economic theory of monetary overhangs is well known and simple, and goes 
back at least to David Hume.  Under fixed exchange rates the undesired domestic money 
leaves the economy through a reduction in international reserves.  This is, indeed, the 
main insight emphasized by the monetary approach to the balance of payments.  This 
option, of course, was not available to Argentina, as the country had virtually run out of 
foreign exchange reserves.  Under flexible exchange rates a monetary overhang is 
resolved through jumps in the nominal exchange rate and in the price level.  These 
nominal adjustments have to be large enough as to eliminate the difference between the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3   At the time of this writing, however, elections had been moved forward to March, 2002. 
4   Most computations of the extent of overvaluation were in the range of 30-45 percent. 
5   See Lipton and Sachs (1990) and Edwards (1992).   5
desired and actual stocks of (real) money.
6  While in theory, these could be once-and-for-
all jumps, in reality this type of adjustment tends to generate all sorts of macroeconomic 
pressures, and usually unleashes an inflationary process that is difficult to control.  It is 
indeed for this reason that throughout the first half of 2002 the IMF argued that lifting the 
deposit freeze would generate chaos.  As an alternative they proposed substituting long 
term bonds for frozen deposits – the characteristics of these bonds, and in particularly 
whether the exchange was to be voluntary and mandatory became a source of heated 
debate. Expropriation of deposits has had a recurrent history in Argentina – the most 
recent episode took place in 1989, when the so-called Bonex Plan was put into place. 
An important question refers to the initial magnitude of the monetary 
disequilibrium generated by the deposit freeze, the devaluation of the peso and default on 
the public sector debt.
7  This disequilibrium – and the associated pressure over the price 
level and the nominal exchange rate -- depend on four key factors:  (1) The extent of the 
decline in the demand for money.  (2) The exchange rate at which dollar-denominated 
deposits are “pesified.” (3) Whether “pesified” deposits are subsequently indexed; and if 
so, in what manner.  And (4) whether all frozen deposits are freed up.  It is easy to show 
that the post-crisis (and pesification) equilibrium price level (P1) and exchange rate (E1) -
- defined as the ones that fully clear the money overhang in the absence of a freeze -- are 
equal to: 
 
(1)      P 1 = (C 0 + D 0 + F 0 E P ) / ( m 1 y 1 ). 
 
(2)      E 1 =  1 + [ ( P 1 - 1 ) / ( b a + { 1 – b }) ].  
 
Where it is assumed that prior to the crisis P0 = E0 = 1.  C 0 is the stock of currency (in 
pesos) in circulation before the crisis, D 0 is the stock of peso denominated deposits – 
both checking account and time deposits -- before the crisis, F 0 is the pre-crisis stock of 
dollar-denominated deposits in the banking system, E P is the exchange rate at which 
                                                           
6   In theory, increasing the demand for money is an alternative way of solving the disequilibrium.  This, 
however, is not likely to happen in Argentina any time soon.   6
these deposits are transformed into pesos after the crisis, and m1 is the new (post crisis) 
desired holdings of money relative to nominal GDP. That is, m1 = M 1 / ( P1 y 1 );  for M 
denoting the stock of broadly-defined nominal money, and y real GDP.  In equation (2), b 
is the share of non-tradable goods in the price level, and a is the “pass-through” 
coefficient.
8   
From these equations it is clear that:  (a) the new equilibrium price level will 
depend on the new demand for money m1, and on the rate at which dollar-denominated 
deposits are “pesified” (E P). The higher is the “pesification” rate, the higher will be the 
required jumps in P.  The lower is the new money demand, the higher will be the required 
jump in the nominal price level.  And (b) the new equilibrium nominal exchange rate will 
depend on the same variables as P 1, as well as on the weight of tradables in the price 
level, and the “pass-through” coefficient.  A higher pass-through, dampens the effect of 
price increases on the nominal exchange rate, and results in a lower real exchange rate 
adjustment. 
Using data from late 2001 it is possible to estimate the “notional” or equilibrium 
nominal exchange rate (E 1), and price level (P 1) in the post crisis period.  Just prior to 
the crisis, currency in circulation was approximately 11 billion pesos; peso-denominated 
deposits stood at15 billion pesos; and dollar denominated deposits amounted to 
approximately US$45 billion.  These deposits were originally pesified at a 1.4 pesos per 
dollar rate.  Assuming a decline in real GDP of 10 percent for 2002 – a figure that 
according to most analysts is on the optimistic side --, we can use a figure of 250 billion 
pesos for y1.  On the bases of a number of studies I assume that the share of tradable 
goods in the price level is 0.5, and the pass through coefficient of 0.6.  The final piece of 
information required for estimating equations (1) and (2) is the post-crisis demand for 
money.  Consider, as an illustration, the case where the new demand for (broad) money is 
equal to 7 percent of GDP.
9  In this case P1 would climb from 1 before the crisis, to 5 
after the crisis, implying a cumulative rate of inflation of 400 percent.  Under these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7   In what follows I concentrate on the initial – that is early 2002 – monetary pressures.  The changing rules  
on de-dollarization result in some changes in the magnitudes involved.  The final effect, however, is similar 
to what I report in this section. 
8   In deriving equations (1) and (2) I used the following expression for inflation:  π = b π N + (1 – b) δ, 
where π N is nontradables inflation, and δ is the rate of nominal devaluation.  I also used the following 
“pass-through” equation: π N  = a δ.   7
assumptions the new equilibrium nominal exchange rate would be 5.1 pesos per dollar.  
If, however, the new demand for money ratio is as low as 5 percent of GDP, the 
equilibrium “notional” exchange rate climbs to 8.7 pesos per dollar!  Even an optimistic 
assumption of a post crisis M to GDP ratio of 10 percent still implies a very high new 
equilibrium nominal exchange rate of 4.2 pesos per dollar.  Notice that this analysis has 
ignored indexation.  If, however, “pesified” deposits are indexed to inflation, the pressure 
on the nominal exchange rate would be even greater, and under some constellation of 
parameters may even be explosive. 
Although the economic profession is still digesting the lessons from Argentina’s 
traumatic crisis, it is already possible to extract some clear conclusions.  Most of these 
lessons are neither new, nor are they surprising.  In fact, as the crisis unfolded many 
observers of the Argentine scene warned the authorities that the experience from prior 
crises suggested that Argentina was facing a very vulnerable situation.  As is usually the 
case, the authorities sneered at these warnings, arguing that Argentina was really very 
different from other countries.   
It is worthwhile repeating these lessons, as in policy circles there is a frightening 
tendency to forget history.  A partial list of lessons, both old and new, would include the 
following:   
•  At the most obvious level the Argentine crisis shows that, contrary to the 
claims of some of its most ardent supporters, a super-fixed exchange rate 
regime is not on its own a solution to a country’s macroeconomic problems.  
In simple words, a currency board is not “a panacea.” 
•  The existence of a currency board does not “force” politicians to run a prudent 
fiscal policy, nor does it result into a lasting low-inflation equilibrium.
10    
•  A perverse fiscal dynamics – where the country fails to generate a primary 
surplus large enough as to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio – usually generates a 
vicious circle, where failure to stabilize the debt ratio results in higher cost of 
funds, lower growth, and in an even larger required primary surplus. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 In mid 2001 the ratio of broad money to GDP stood at approximately 40 percent of GDP. 
10   Hanke and Schuler (1994, page 28) arguably two of the most ardent supporters of currency boards 
wrote:  “Because a CB [currency board] cannot finance budget deficits…, the CB establishes an implicit 
low-inflation fiscal constitution…”   8
•  Fiscal federalism issues are of paramount importance when determining the 
political economy of fiscal policy.  In Argentina, the inability to bring the 
provinces’ finances into check was a key ingredient in the unfolding of the 
crisis.  Institutional arrangements that bring different province or states into 
line with overall fiscal objectives may help.  An important question, however, 
is how to design exactly such institutions.  Some have argued that the EMU’s 
“Growth and Stability Pact,” is the type of institution that would help deal 
with fiscal federalism issues.
11  Whether the pact actually works in the future 
is still to be seen, however. 
•  Situations of real exchange rate overvaluation are very costly, and lead to low 
growth and in some cases even stagnation.  Moreover, under super-fixed 
nominal exchange rate regimes overvaluation is very difficult to resolve.  This 
notion is far from new – in fact, Keynes wrote extensively about it when 
discussing inter-war international financial problems --, but is one that policy 
makers seem to forget over and over again.
12   
•  Economies with a low degree of openness to international trade have 
difficulties adjusting to external shocks.  More specifically, and as has been 
emphasized by a number of authors since at least James Meade’s monumental 
oeuvre The Balance of Payments, the costs of adjustment are proportional to 
the inverse of the marginal degree of openness of the economy. 
•  In the presence of de facto dollarization, large devaluations wreck balance 
sheets, and generate very costly bankruptcies.  This, in fact, was also one of 
the most important lessons of the Chilean currency crisis of 1982. 
Surprisingly, not enough attention has been given to that particular episode 
when studying the genesis of modern currency crises.
 13 
•  Defaulting on the public may be very costly.  Indeed, contrary to what a 
number of foreign and Argentine analysts had claimed the experience of 
Argentina during 2002 indicates that there isn’t such a thing as a “painless” 
                                                           
11   See Hochreiter, Schmidt-hebbel and Winckler (2002), for a discussion along these lines. 
12   Of course, the overvaluation lesson is an important one from previous Latin American crises, including 
Chile’s crisis in the 1970s and the Mexican crisis of 1994.       9
default.  Some may argue that it was not the default per se what caused so 
much havoc, but rather the awful policies that accompanied it.  But that is 
exactly the point.  Defaults don’t come in a clean, surgical way.  They are 
messy and costly. 
•  Perhaps the most important lesson stemming from Argentina is that, contrary 
to what a number of authors have claimed, a banking system dominated by 
major foreign banks may still be subject to a run on deposits.  This was indeed 
what happened in Argentina throughout 2001, and what induced Minister 
Cavallo to impose the ill-fated deposit freeze and exchange controls in early 
December of that year.
14 
•  Related to the previous point, there are a number of serious risks associated to 
a highly dollarized banking system. In particular, in the absence of a lender of 
last resort – as is almost always the case when the banking system is highly 
dollarized -- a run-of-the-mill crisis may be transformed into a major 
catastrophe.  An important question is whether it is wise for emerging markets 
to encourage foreign-currency denominated deposits in their banking system. 
 
III.  The Argentine Debacle, the Quest for Hard Pegs, and Dollarization 
Most supporters of super-fixed exchange rate regimes have not changed their 
views after the Argentine debacle.  Instead, they have followed a three-part strategy.  The 
first component of this strategy has been a “bastardization” of the Argentine experience. 
All of a sudden no one recognizes Argentina as having been an example of a true hard 
peg regime. The Wall Street Journal editorial page, which for a number of years 
supported Argentina, suddenly argued that Argentina didn’t really have a “true” currency 
board, or sound monetary policy.  Although it is true that some analysts referred to the 
Argentine arrangement as “mimicking” a currency board, it is also true that before the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13   Edwards and Edwards (1991). 
14  A standard criticism of hard pegs – currency boards and dollarization -- is that the country is left without 
a lender of last resort.  Supporters of super-fixed regimes responded that to the extent that the banking 
system is dominated by top-of-the-line foreign banks, a run on deposits would be unthinkable.  Argentina 
proved that this is certainly not the case.   10
crisis the vast majority of super-fixers praised the Argentine experience.
15  This 
“bastardization” strategy may be somewhat effective in debates carried out in the popular 
press, but is not very interesting from an intellectual point of view, and I will not it any 
further.  The second component of the “super-fixers” post-Argentina strategy is to argue 
that the preferred super-fixed regime is “dollarization,” or a regime where the country in 
question gives up its own currency and adopts an advanced nation currency as legal 
tender.  According to this argument, countries that dollarize will truly eliminate currency 
risk, and will outperform nations with a currency of their own.  Finally, the third element 
of the super-fixers’ strategy has been to argue that emerging markets have no alternative 
but to adopt a (true) hard peg (i.e. dollarization).  According to this view, emerging 
countries cannot really adopt a flexible exchange rate: they exhibit “fear of floating,” and 
systematically intervene in the foreign exchange market in a destabilizing way.  In this 
section I will deal with dollarization and its record; in Section IV I focus on the feasibility 
of flexible exchange rates in emerging countries.   
III.1  Dollarized Countries are Very Small 
There is a great myth about dollarization. It turns out that until recently we knew 
very little about how countries have performed under this regime, and most of what we 
know is based on the experience of Panama, a country that has been dollarized since 
1904.  My co-author I.Igal Magendzo and I have looked at this issue quite carefully, and 
we have been able to find twenty independent countries that have strict dollarization and 
enough data as to perform a serious evaluation.  The starting point in this discussion is to 
notice that the median population of those 20 independent countries is 145,000 people – 
not exactly large countries.  Moreover, these small countries don’t collect a lot of data; as 
a result it is not possible to know much about their economic record.  There are certain 
things, however, that we do know about dollarized economies. For example, we know 
that they have higher bilateral trade than countries with a currency of their own. This is a 
result that comes from research undertaken by Engel and Rose (2002) and Frankel and 
Rose (2002). Persson (2001), however, has persuasively argued that even though this 
trade effect exists, it is not nearly as strong as it was originally thought. We also have 
                                                           
15  Kurt Schuler, the author of some of the most serious work on currency boards, even included Argentina 
in his “team of currency boards,” in a public wager that he posted in the Internet.   11
some (limited) evidence indicating that although currency risk tends to disappear, 
dollarized countries don’t necessarily have a lower cost of capital than countries with a 
currency of their own.  Consider the case of Panama, the dollarized nation par excellence. 
Between 1997 and 1998, for example, the average daily spread on Panamanian dollar-
denominated Brady par bonds was 464 basis points.  Although this was lower than the 
spread on equivalent Argentine bonds ( 710 basis points), it was not the lowest spread in 
Latin America.  In fact, and as is illustrated in Edwards (2001), during this period the 
spread over Panamanian bonds was systematically and significantly higher than that over 
Chile’s sovereign bonds of similar maturity.
16  Interestingly, Chile is a country that 
during the period under discussion experienced an overall increase in its degree of 
exchange rate flexibility. The comparison between Chile and Panama underscores the 
very simple but important point that dollarization does not by itself reduce country risk.  
In fact, during the last few years, and in spite of its improved fiscal performance, Panama 
has experienced a sizable country risk premium and has been subject to “contagion.”
17  
III.2  Dollarization and Economic Performance:  Some Formal Tests 
In a series of papers Igal Magendzo and I have used a cross-country panel data set 
to investigate performance – GDP per capita growth, inflation and growth volatility -- in 
dollarized countries. The data set is an unbalanced panel that covers 1970 through 1998, 
and includes 199 counties and territories – both dollarized countries and countries with a 
currency of their own.  The number of observations varies, depending on the performance 
variable considered.  There are 3,174 observations on inflation and 4,888 observations on 
growth per capita.  In investigating the behavior of volatility we used a cross section for 
1990-97 that includes 194 countries.
18  The data set includes data on 20 strictly dollarized 
countries.   
We compared performance in dollarized and countries with a currency of their 
own, using a “treatment effect” methodology.  More specifically, we undertook a non-
                                                           
16   Bogetic (2000, p. 193) has claimed that “Panama’s sovereign spreads have been consistently lower than 
in other Latin American countries.”  As figure 1 shows, this is not so.  The spreads in Figure 1 correspond 
to daily data for Panama’s 8 ½ % sovereign bond due in 2008, and Chile’s 6 7/8 % sovereign bond due in 
2009.   
17 El Salvador, a country that dollarized recently, will eventually provide an interesting case study that will 
allow us to learn more about the effects of dollarization on interest rate behavior, the cost of capital and 
other key macroeconomic variables. 
18   When alternative 5-year averages were used, there were no significant changes in the results.   12
parametric analysis based on “matching estimators” (see Blundell and Costa-Dias2000). 
A general advantage of this non-parametric method is that no particular specification of 
the underlying model has to be assumed.
19 Matching estimators pair each dollarized 
country with countries from the with-domestic-currency group.  If the sample is large 
enough, for each treated (dollarized) observation we can find, in principle, at least one 
untreated observation with exactly the same characteristics as the treated – in our case 
dollarized -- observation.  Each of these properly selected untreated observations 
provides the required counterfactual for our comparative analysis.
20  The problem is that 
under most general conditions it is not possible to find an exact match between a treated 
and untreated observation. The matching estimator method focuses on estimating an 
average version of the parameter of interest.
21 That is, the matching estimator consists of 
obtaining the difference in outcome as an average of the differences with respect to 
“similar” -- rather than identical -- untreated outcomes. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
have shown that an efficient and simple way to perform this comparison is to rely on a 
propensity score, defined as the probability of participation or treatment: 
P(x)=Prob(D=1/ x). In our case, this is the probability of a country being a dollarized 
country. This reduces a multi-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional problem, 
provided that we can estimate P(x). Instead of matching countries directly on all of their 
characteristics, we can compare countries with similar probability of being a dollarized 
country. We used two alternative methods for computing matching estimators.  First, we 
used a simple-average nearest neighbor estimator. According to this method, for each 
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  ) 0 , / ( ) 1 , / ( ) ( 0 0 = − = = D x u E D x u E x B . 
20 In order to guarantee that all treated agents have such a counterpart in the population (not necessarily in 
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treated observation, we select a pre-determined number of untreated nearest neighbor(s). 
The nearest neighbors of a particular treated observation i are defined as those untreated 
observations that have the smallest difference in propensity score with respect to i. If we 




=  for the observations that have been 
selected; for other observations we set  ij W =0.  We applied the above method to both one 
nearest neighbor and five nearest neighbors.  The second method consists of using local 
linear regressions to identify each matching observation (Fan 1993).  
The results from the matching estimators in Edwards and Magendzo (2001) are 
presented in Table 1.  For each variable of interest –inflation, growth, and volatility – the 
table reports data on (a) the number of countries and number of observations in the 
control group; (b) The “mean difference,” calculated as the mean of the differences, for 
each variable, of the dollarized economies and the corresponding non-dollarized control 
group.  And (c) the “median difference,” calculated as the median of the differences of 
the dollarized economies and the corresponding non-dollarized control group.  For both 
the mean and the median difference the table includes, in parentheses, a t-statistic for 
their statistical significance.  The test for the mean difference is a standard t-statistic, 
while that for the difference in median was calculated using a bootstrapping procedure.  
Finally, and for comparison purposes, I report the means and medians differences 
obtained when the unadjusted control group of all dollarized countries is used 
(“unadjusted comparisons”).   
The results may be summarized as follows: First, for every one of the matching 
indicators both the mean and median difference in inflation are negative and significantly 
different from zero.  This indicates that the dollarized economies have had significantly 
lower yearly rate of inflation than the non-dollarized countries.  According to these 
results, however, the mean difference in inflation is much smaller that what the simple, 
uncorrected comparisons would suggest. Second, for every one of the matching 
indicators the GDP per capita growth differences – both for means and medians -- are 
negative.  And they are significantly negative in seven out of the eight matching 
estimators reported in Table 1; the only exception is for the mean difference using one 
nearest neighbor.  Overall I interpret these results as providing fairly strong evidence that,   14
once appropriate control groups are defined, the dollarized economies have tended to 
experience lower GDP per capita growth than the non-dollarized ones.  This conclusion 
is, in fact, supported by the local linear regression results reported in Edwards and 
Magendzo (2001).  In terms of magnitudes, the results from the matching analysis 
indicate that dollarized countries’ underperformed no-dollarized countries by a wider 
margin than what simple comparisons suggest.  The (statistically significant) mean 
differences in GDP per capita growth in Table 1 range from –1.56% per year to –1.12% 
per year; the unadjusted mean difference is only –0.69%.    The median differences in 
GDP per capita growth in Table 1 range from –1.53% per year to –1.01% per year; the 
unadjusted mean difference is –1.41%.  And third, statistically speaking, the matching 
results reported in Table 1 indicate there are no differences (either in the means or 
medians) in volatility in dollarized and non-dollarized economies.   
 
IV.  On the Feasibility of Exchange Rate Flexibility in Emerging Countries:  Fear 
of Floating or Optimal Floatation? 
 
For many years it has been argued that emerging countries cannot successfully 
adopt a freely floating exchange rate regime. 
 This view has recently become particularly 
popular among supporters of super-fixed exchange rate systems. Two reasons have 
traditionally been given for this position: first, it has been argued that since emerging 
countries’ tend to export commodities and/or light manufactures, a floating exchange rate 
would be “excessively” volatile.  Second, and related to the previous point, it has been 
argued that emerging countries don’t have the institutional requirements for undertaking 
effective monetary policy under purely floating exchange rates (Summers 2000). 
According to this perspective, emerging markets that float would be unable to implement 
the type of (rather complex) feedback rule required for implementing an effective 
inflation targeting system.  In particular, it has been argued that countries that float after 
currency crisis will be unable to stabilize the value of their currency.  This view is 
captured expressed in Eichengreen et al (1998 p. 18-19) who after discussing the merits 
of floating rates and inflation targeting, state: 
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“[I]t is questionable whether a freely floating exchange rate and an inflation target 
objective for monetary policy are feasible, advisable or fully credible for many 
developing and transition economies…[T]hese economies are subject to 
substantial larger internal and external shocks…and the transmission mechanisms 
through which monetary policy affects the economy and the price level tend to be 
less certain and reliable…” 
 
More recently, a new objection to floating in emerging markets has been raised.  
Some authors, most notably Calvo (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and their 
associates, have argued that in a world with high capital mobility, incomplete 
information, fads, rumors and a dollar-denominated liabilities the monetary authorities 
will be severely affected by a “fear to float” (Reinhart 2000).  This is because significant 
exchange rate movements – and in particular large depreciations—will tend to have 
negative effects on inflation and on foreign currency denominated debt.  According to 
this view, “floating regimes” in emerging markets will be so only in name.  In reality, 
countries that claim to float will be “closet peggers,” making every effort, through direct 
intervention (selling and buying reserves), and interest rate manipulation, to avoid large 
exchange rate fluctuations.  These countries will be in the worst of worlds: they will have 
a de-facto rigid exchange rates and high interest rates.  Reinhart (2000) has aptly 
summarized the “fear to float” view: 
 
“Countries that say that they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not;  
there seems to be an epidemic case of “fear of floating.”  Relative to more 
committed floaters…exchange rate volatility is quite low…[T]his low relative-
exchange rate volatility is the deliberate result of policy actions to stabilize the 
exchange rate…” (page 65). 
 
After analyzing the behavior of exchange rate, international reserves and nominal interest 
rate volatility, Reinhart (2000) concludes that those emerging markets usually considered 
to be floaters – Bolivia, India and Mexico – are subject to the fear of floating syndrome.  
She goes on to argue that, under these circumstances, “lack of credibility remains a   16
serious problem,” and that the only way to avoid it may be “full dollarization.” (page 69) 
– see also Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
  In a recent paper Levy and Sturzenegger (2000) follow (independently) an 
approach similar to that proposed by Reinhart (2000) to analyze exchange rate policy in 
emerging economies.  These authors use data on the volatility of international reserves, 
the volatility of exchange rates, and the volatility of exchange rate changes for 99 
countries, during the period 1990-1998, to determine their “true” exchange rate regime.  
Their analysis begins with the well-known fact that the classification system used by the 
IMF tends to misclassify countries. The authors undertake a series of cluster analysis 
exercises to classify the countries in their sample into five categories:  (1) fixed; (2) dirty 
float/crawling peg; (3) dirty float; (4) float; and (5) inconclusive.  The results from this 
study tend to contradict the “fear of floating” hypothesis.  Indeed, Levy and Sturzenegger 
find out that for their complete sample, 273 cases out of a total of 955, can be classified 
as floaters.  This, of course, does mean that a number of countries are wrongly classified 
according to the IMF.  For example, they find that in 1998 there were 12 countries that 
had classified as floaters by the Fund, but that did not really float.  Interestingly enough, 
there were also some fixers that did not fix (see also the recent paper by Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2002).   
Some of the emerging countries that, according to Levy and Sturzenegger, had a 
floating regime during 1997-98 (the last two years of their sample) include Chile, 
Colombia, Ghana, India, and South Africa.  A particularly important case is Mexico, a 
country whose authorities have strongly claimed to have adopted a floating rate after the 
collapse of 1994.  The Levy and Sturzenegger analysis indeed suggests that, after a 
transitional period in the two years immediately following the currency crisis, Mexico 
has had, since 1997, a freely floating exchange rate regime.  According to this study, 
during 1995 Mexico had a dirty/crawling peg regime.  This evolved, in 1996, to a dirty 
float, and finally in 1997 to a freely float.  This means, then, that Mexico’s experience 
can indeed be used as an illustration of the way in which a floating regime will tend to 
work in an emerging country.  Of course, it is not possible to extract general conclusions 
from a single episode, but in the absence of other experiences with anything that   17
resembles a floating rate, analyses of Mexico’s foray with exchange rate flexibility 
should prove very useful. 
IV.I Volatility and External Disturbances  
Detailed studies on (nominal) exchange rate volatility in emerging countries 
provide no support for either the idea that these have been excessively volatile or 
“abnormally” stable.  An analysis reported by Edwards and Savastano (2000) for the case 
of Mexico indicate that the peso dollar rate was as volatile as the other currencies during 
1997.  In 1998, its degree of volatility increased significantly, but was lower than the 
yen/dollar rate.  In 1999 the extent of volatility declined, and the peso was once again in 
the middle of the pack.  The overall conclusion from the high frequency volatility 
analysis is, then, that there Mexico does not appears to be different, in terms of volatility, 
from other floaters.   
In a recent paper Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2002) have used the new exchange 
rate regime classification to investigate whether floating exchange rates act as effective 
shock absorbers and, thus, help countries deal with external disturbances.  They use a 
panel data set and analyze the way in which terms of trade shocks impact real GDP 
growth.  Their results indicate that countries with (genuine) flexible exchange rates are 
less affected by terms of trade disturbances, and tend to grow faster than countries with 
rigid or semi-rigid exchange rare regimes. 
IV.2   Monetary Policy, Feedback Rules, Intervention and “Fear of Floating” 
 The “fear of floating” critique implicitly assumes that the optimal policy for the 
emerging countries is a clean float, without any type of government intervention. Thus, 
by intervening in the foreign exchange market, the authorities are pursuing a sub-optimal 
course of action and are introducing destabilizing forces.  This, however, needs not be the 
case.  Indeed, it is perfectly possible that the optimal policy – that is as the policy that 
minimizes a well-defined loss function – is one where the central bank intervenes from 
time to time.  
From a technical point of view this discussion may be framed in terms of the form 
of the Taylor rule in an small open economy. Taylor himself has posed the problem as 
follows (2001, p. 263):  “How should the instruments of monetary policy (the interest rate   18
or a monetary aggregate) react to the exchange rate?” In order to address this question 
more formally, consider the following equation (See Taylor, 2001): 
 
(3)        r t = f π  t + g y t + h o e t + h 1 e t – 1. 
 
Where r t is the short term interest rate used by the central bank as a policy tool, π  t is the 
deviation of the rate of inflation from its target level – possibly zero --, y t is the deviation 
of real GDP from potential real GDP, and e t is the log of the real exchange rate in year 
t.
22  f and g are the traditional Taylor rule coefficients; h 0 and h 1 are the coefficients of 
the current and lagged log of the real exchange rates in the expanded Taylor rule, and are 
the main interest of this discussion.  Traditional analyses have assumed that the central 
bank should ignore open economy considerations when undertaking monetary policy – in 
terms of equation (3) this means that h 0 = h 1 = 0.  It is conceivable, however, that in a 
small open economy the optimal monetary policy rule – that is the policy that maximizes 
the authorities’ objective function – is one where both h 0 and h 1 are different from zero. 
Interestingly, if h 0 < 0 and h 1 = - h 0, then the rule implies that monetary policy should 
react to changes in the (real) exchange rate.  Notice that the formulation in equation (3) 
does not imply, even when h 0 and h 1 are different from zero, that the monetary 
authorities should defend a certain level of the exchange rate. 
  If the optimal policy calls for intervention – that is for h 0 and h 1 different than 
zero --, and if the monetary authorities do follow this policy, a casual observer may 
conclude that the country in question is subject to “fear of floating.”  This, however, 
would be an incorrect inference, as the country in question would be practicing “optimal 
flotation.” 
At this point the profession seems to be somewhat divided on whether h 0 and h 1 
should indeed be different from zero.  For example, Taylor (2001) has expressed some 
skepticism on the merits of adding the exchange rate into the interest rate equation; he 
argues that the exchange rate already plays an indirect role through its effect on π t and y 
t.  Ball (1999), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson (2000), and on the other hand, 
have argued that adding the exchange rate as an additional variable in equation (3) will   19
result in more stable macroeconomic outcomes.  According to a simulation exercise 
undertaken by Svensson (2000) the optimal values of the exchange rate coefficients are h 
0 = -0.45 and h 1 = 0.45.  Ball (1999) analysis suggests that macroeconomic instability 
will be reduced if h 0 = -0.37 and h 1 = 0.17.  In a recent study Ades (2002) has estimated 
a number of Taylor rules for emerging countries, and has concluded that the majority of 
them do pay some attention to the exchange rate when conducting monetary policy.  
Although analyses on these issues still are at a preliminary stage, it is clear that not all 
policy reactions to exchange rate development need to be sub-optimal, nor should be 
labeled as “fear of floating.”    
  The preceding discussion has been undertaken in terms of “non sterilized” 
intervention, where the authorities alter the course of monetary policy in response to 
developments in the exchange rate front.  A somewhat different question – and possibly a 
more important one from a policy perspective – is whether it is optimal for the authorities 
to engage in “sterilized intervention.”  Goldfajn and Silveira (2002) have recently 
addressed this issue.  The point of departure of their analysis is the simple proposition 
that in the absence of externalities it is difficult to justify government interventions.  They 
then build a general equilibrium model where debtors and creditors have different views 
of the world.  More specifically, debtors are more pessimistic than creditors.  In this 
world with heterogeneous beliefs, there are “congestion” effects and the private sector 
will tend to under hedge its foreign currency exposure. The authors show that in this case 
– and under the assumption of an overly pessimistic foreign sector – government 
intervention to smooth exchange rate risk may, indeed, be Pareto improving.  Whether 
this type of results can be generalized will require additional research. 
 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
The recurrence of currency crises during the last few years has prompted analysts 
and academics to reconsider the traditional wisdom regarding exchange rate policy.  An 
important development has been the so-called “two-corners” solution, according to which 
emerging nations should avoid intermediate exchange rate regimes.  They should either 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22   In this formulation an increase in e denotes a real exchange rate appreciation.   20
opt for a floating exchange rate or for a hard peg – a currency boards or strict 
dollarization.  
For many years Argentina was considered to be the greatest example of the merits 
of super-fixed exchange rate regimes. The abandonment of the currency board in early 
2002, and the massive collapse of the Argentine economy, have opened a host of 
questions regarding the selection of exchange rate regimes in developing countries. While 
for some authors this episode reflected the fact that super-fixed regimes were highly 
inflexible and inhibited the adjustment process, for others it was an illustration that “true” 
super-fixity – that is dollarization – was the only feasible exchange rate regime for the 
emerging economies.  Recent discussions have also dealt with the feasibility of having 
genuine floating rates in countries with underdeveloped capital markets.  In this paper I 
have analyzed some of the most important issues that have been at the center of the 
exchange rate debate.  I have reviewed the experience with strict dollarization, and I have 
discussed problems related with “fear of floating.”  I argue that economic performance 
under dollarization has been mixed: while inflation has been lower in dollarized countries 
than in countries with a currency of their own, growth has been significantly lower.  
Proponents of the “fear of floating” view argue that emerging countries cannot have a 
true floating regime: they systematically intervene in the foreign exchange market, 
creating a highly unstable economic environment.  I argue that in many cases it is optimal 
for these countries to react to exchange rate developments.  It is not “fear of floating,” it 
is “optimal floatation.” 
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TABLE 1 
Matching Estimators:   
Inflation, GDP per Capita Growth and Volatility* 
 
 
 Number  of 
Control 
Countries 








M1R 22  197  -3.53  -3.15 
     (-5.68)  (-4.00) 
 
M1N 28  197  -3.39  -1.92 
     (-5.01)  (-2.82) 
 
M5R 31  985  -3.89  -4.45 
     (-9.03)  (-9.89) 
 
M5N 53  985  -5.68  -4.42 
     (-5.98)  (-8.41) 
 
B. GDP per capita growth 
M1R 29  386  -0.28  -1.05 
     (-0.47)  (-3.03) 
 
M1N 35  386  -1.56  -1.53 
     (-2.78)  (-3.88) 
 
M5R 40  1,930  -1.12  -1.01 
     (-2.48)  (-3.34) 
 
M5N 79  1,930  -1.19  -1.30 
     (-2.78)  (-2.71) 
C.Volatility of Growth 
M1R 12  386  0.86  0.42 
     (0.63)  (0.24) 
 
M1N 16  386  0.62  1.29 
     (0.40)  (0.51) 
 
M5R 71  1930  0.72  1.59 
     (0.74)  (0.86) 
 
M5N
a  - -  -  - 
        
 
*:  M1R refers to one nearest neighbor, with replacement. M1N refers to one nearest neighbor, without 
replacement. M5R refers to five nearest neighbors, with replacement. M5N refers to five nearest neighbors, 
without replacement.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
a:  Not computed because the number of observations was too small. 
  Source:  Edwards and Magendzo (2001). 
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